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Divided Sovereignty in the Genghisid States as 
Exemplified by the Crimean Khanate: 
“Oriental Despotism” à rebours?
Dariusz Kołodziejczyk
In 1957, when Karl Wittfogel published his seminal book on “Oriental 
Despotism,”1 it was evident from the outset that the author’s arguments were 
heavily biased against Russia and deeply rooted in the Cold War atmosphere. 
Wittfogel’s chief argument about the liaison between irrigation and state des-
potism had to wait for its critics until more recent times,2 but his treatment of 
Russia as an example of a “hydraulic society” was immediately perceived as 
an intellectual aberration. Nonetheless, the notion of Russia as an “Oriental 
Tyranny” or “Asiatic Tyranny” proved handy in journalistic efforts to explain 
the Soviet system to a Western reader, and it has retained some popular cur-
rency up to the present day. In a paragraph of his book, headed “The Introduc-
tion of Oriental Despotism into Russia,” Wittfogel blamed the Tatars for being 
“decisive both in destroying the non-Oriental Kievan society and in laying the 
foundations for the despotic state of Muscovite and post-Muscovite Russia.” In 
doing so, he invoked such different authorities as historians Vasilij Ključevskij3 
and George Vernadsky, and... the poet Alexander Pushkin.4 Among the tremen-
dously rich literary tradition that blames the Mongols and Tatars for infecting 
the Russian soul with the spirit of despotism, two other influential writers can 
be named here: a nineteenth-century French author Marquis de Custine5 and 
an early twentieth-century Polish historian Jan Kucharzewski.6
 1 Karl Wittfogel,  Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, 1957).
 2 For a recent discussion, invoking earlier literature, see Alan Mikhail,          Nature and Empire in 
Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 31–37.
 3 The system of Latin transcription, adopted in the present article with the kind permis-
sion of the ASI Editorial Commission and differentiating between Russian, Ruthenian, 
and modern Ukrainian texts recorded in the Cyrillic script, is based on the one proposed 
by George Shevelov, although with a number of modifications; for additional details, see 
Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate and Poland–Lithuania: International Diplomacy 
on the European Periphery (15th–18th Century). A Study of Peace Treaties Followed by Annotated 
Documents (Leiden, 2011), pp. 524–525.
 4 Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, pp. 219–225, esp. p. 225.
 5 See especially his letter from July �, 1�39, in Astolphe markiz de Custine,             Listy z Rosji. Rosja 
w 1839 roku (Warszawa 1991), pp. 1�–19 [I quote the Polish edition.].
 6 See Jan Kucharzewski,   Od Białego Caratu do Czerwonego, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1926); for typi-
cal terms such as “the savage school of Mongol slavery” or “Mongol tyranny” see the 
abridged English translation: The Origins of Modern Russia (New York, 194�), pp. 19–20.
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To state that the Muscovian rulers borrowed despotic forms of govern-
ment from the Tatars, one must tacitly assume that such forms were indig-
enous and “natural” for the Tatar society. Yet, such an assumption is far from 
the truth. At times of great military conquests, most notably during the reign 
of Genghis Khan, high-level centralization and violent suppression of domes-
tic opposition might have been achieved temporarily in the Mongol empire, 
but to make this vast empire function and survive in the long term, the coop-
eration of local elites must have been secured. To strengthen and legitimize 
their rule, the khans were compelled to share the spoils of war and the rights 
to exploit subjugated populations with their immediate family members, the 
leading Mongol and Tatar clan leaders and their followers, rank and file war-
riors, and finally, landed and urban elites as well as clergymen7 belonging to 
various ethno-religious groups peopling the Genghisid empire. Given the lack 
of precise inheritance rules in steppe society, following the death of Genghis 
Khan any of his agnate descendants would have been able to claim the throne. 
Consequently, with the ongoing fragmentation of the Eurasian empire once 
founded by Genghis Khan, the members of various branches of the Genghisid 
dynasty, who struggled to secure control over the whole empire or at least 
its substantial parts, were in desperate need of cooperation from the side of 
the local elites. In the Mongol tradition, the election of the khan as well as his 
most important decisions was subject to acceptance by the noble general as-
sembly known as qurultay. This institution survived in the late Genghisid states 
in Eastern Europe, with which Muscovy maintained intensive contacts, most 
notably the Kazan Khanate and the Crimean Khanate.� In the sixteenth-century 
Muscovian chronicles one finds numerous mentions of qurultay, referred to as 
vsja zemlja, i.e. “the whole land,” thus the Russians must have been familiar 
with this “democratic” institution of their Mongol–Tatar neighbors.9
 7 To invoke just one example, regarding the privileges granted to Russian clergymen by the 
khans of the Golden Horde, see Arkadij Grigor’ev, Sbornik xanskix jarlykov russkim mitro-
politam. Istočnikovedčeskij analiz zolotoordynskix dokumentov (St. Petersburg, 2004).
 8 �t is worth emphasizing that a number of Mongol traditional institutions, reflecting the pat�             -
tern of “steppe democracy,” survived better in Genghisid states in Eastern Europe, Siberia, 
and Central Asia, than in Persia and China, where the rulers from the Ilkhanid and Yuan 
dynasties largely adopted local models of kingship typical for the urbanized and bureau-
cratized empires that had existed in Persia and China since ancient times.
 9 See Mixail �udjakov,   Očerki po istorii Kazanskogo xanstva (Moscow, 1991 [first published in 
1923]), pp. 191–196, and Donald Ostrowski, “Ruling Class Structures of the Kazan Khan-
ate,” in H. Güzel, C. Oğuz, and O. Karatay, eds., The Turks, vol. 2: Middle Ages (Ankara, 
2002), pp. �41–�47, esp. p. �44 (both aforementioned studies refer to the Kazan Khanate, 
but their conclusions apply just as well to the Crimean Khanate).
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“Steppe Democracy” aS reflecteD in the crimean Khanate’S
foreign relationS
This article addresses the problem of divided sovereignty in the Crime-
an Khanate, the last Genghisid state in Eastern Europe, which was to persist 
until 17�3. It is based on the records related to the diplomatic exchanges be-
tween the Crimean Khanate and its northern neighbors: Poland–Lithuania10 
and Muscovy.11 The question of who was in charge of the Khanate’s foreign 
policy and with whom one should negotiate political agreements reappeared 
with regular frequency in both mutual negotiations and in internal discourse 
at the courts in Moscow, Vilnius, Cracow (later Warsaw), as well as Qırq Yer 
(later Baghchasaray).
Any foreign envoy sent to the Crimean Khanate in the sixteenth or seven-
teenth century knew that it was insufficient to negotiate with the khan. Peace 
treaties concluded by the Tatars with their northern Christian neighbors were 
typically negotiated, sworn and confirmed by numerous members of the Gi-
ray dynasty, the four clan leaders named qaraçi beys,12 lesser Tatar and Nogay 
nobles, Muslim clergymen, and courtiers.
The most prominent Crimean dignitary after the khan was the qalġa13 
– typically a younger brother or the eldest son of the ruling khan. In the earli-
est yarlıqs (khan decrees) and şartnames (oath-letters) addressed to the Polish–
Lithuanian rulers, the name of the qalġa is listed among the personalities who 
swore the peace, directly after the name of the khan. In the subsequent period, 
the qalġas began to edit their own instruments of peace.
While the consent of the qalġa was instrumental for securing peace even 
when his relations with the khan were impeccable, it was even more crucial 
during internal conflicts within the Giray family. �n 1527, during uneasy co-
 10 Until the early sixteenth century Vilnius and Cracow maintained contacts with the Crimea             
separately even though Poland and Lithuania were joined by a dynastic union. Nonethe-
less, already in this period one observes a gradual amalgamation in the foreign policy of 
the two states. For instance, Casimir and Sigismund were titled as kings when they re-
ceived Crimean embassies in Vilnius, although in Lithuania they formally acted as grand 
dukes and not as the kings of Poland.
 11 Foreign policy is of course but one “window” through which one might view the Crimean               
structure of power. No less valuable insight can be gained through the examination of 
such aspects of the Khanate’s domestic policy as the distribution of lands and pasturages, 
the structure of tax collection, or the unequal levels of the khan’s jurisdiction over various 
segments of Crimean society; for a recent ground�breaking study of the latter aspect, un-
dertaken by Natalia Królikowska, see n. 60 below.
 12 On their role in the Mongol world, see Uli Schamiloglu, “The           Qaraçı Beys of the Later 
Golden Horde: Notes of the Organization of the Mongol World Empire,” Archivum Eur-
asiae Medii Aevi 4 (Wiesbaden, 19�4), pp. 2�3–297.
 13 On the term and its usage, see �oseph Matuz, �Qal�a”          Turcica. Revue d’études turques 2 
(1970), pp. 101–129.
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habitation between the khan Sa‘adet Giray and his nephew, the qalġa Islam Gi-
ray, the Polish–Lithuanian diplomacy secured two instruments of peace issued 
separately by both Girays.14 The fact that Islam Giray received foreign embas-
sies and that he could issue a peace instrument separately from the ruling khan 
contributed to a somewhat blurred picture of the khanate’s domestic hierarchy 
of that period, both in his contemporaries’ opinions and in modern historiog-
raphy. �n 1532, during the renewed open conflict between Sa‘adet Giray and 
Islam Giray, the lords of the Lithuanian Council wrote to King Sigismund that 
“in the present time there have remained two khans in this Horde” (teperešneho 
času na toj Orde dva cary zostaly).15 This vision found a modern corroboration in 
the opinion of Władysław Pociecha, an eminent Polish historian, who observed 
that, in 1534, King Sigismund of Poland had dispatched an embassy to “both 
khans” (do obu chanów) who reigned in the Crimea.16
In the seventeenth century, the qalġas had their own chancery based in 
Aq Mesdjid Saray, their residence located near modern Simferopol. They is-
sued documents provided with their own monograms (tuġras), not inferior in 
artistic quality to the monograms of the ruling khans.17 Two instruments of 
peace (‘ahdnames), issued by Qal�a �slam Giray along with the instruments of 
his elder brother, Khan Bahadır Giray, in 1637 and 1640, have been preserved 
in the Polish archives.1�
The qalġas also corroborated peace instruments along with or on behalf 
of the ruling khans. �n 1595, after the Ottoman–Polish negotiations at Ţuţora/
Cecora, in which the Ottomans were assisted by the Tatars, the resulting peace 
 14 See the instruments from 1527 issued by Khan Sa‘adet Giray and Qal�a �slam Giray, pub�              -
lished in Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 665–6�0.
 15 See A. Dubonis, ed.,    Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 15 (1528–1538). Užrašymų knyga 15 (Vilnius, 
2002), p. 174. 
 16 Pociecha’s observation is related to the period when Islam Giray once again rioted against              
the ruling khan, Sahib Giray (r. 1532–1551), another uncle of his; Acta Tomiciana, vol. 16, 
pt. 1 (Wrocław etc., 1960), p. 597, n. 11. Albeit reflecting the de facto Crimean realities of 
that time, the opinion of the Polish scholar is nonetheless misleading. The Polish court 
often tacitly supported Islam Giray in the hope of weakening the ruling khan, but it could 
not risk open confrontation with the Ottoman sultan, whom Sahib Giray owed his throne; 
hence, in the Polish–Ottoman peace treaty, concluded shortly before, in 1533, King Sigis-
mund formally acknowledged Sahib Giray as the Crimean khan and engaged not to assist 
the Crimean malcontents; see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman–Polish Diplomatic Relations 
(15th–18th Century): An Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden, 2000), 
p. 233.
 17 �or some fine e�amples, published in color facsimiles, see Sagit �aizov,           Tugra i Vselen-
naja. Moxabbat-name i šert-name krymskix xanov i princev v ornamental’nom, sakral’nom i 
diplomatičeskom kontekstax (Moscow-Baghchasaray, 2002).
 18 Published in Kołodziejczyk,   The Crimean Khanate, pp. 919–922 and 942–947; the instrument 
from 1640 is preserved in the Turkish original, provided with Islam Giray’s tuġra (see ibid., 
facs. I�a-c), whereas the instrument from 1637 is extant only in a Polish translation. Islam 
Giray later became Khan Islam III Giray (r. 1644–1654).
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instrument of the Muslim side was corroborated by Khan Ghazi II Giray, his 
brother, Qal�a �eth Giray, and the Ottoman governor of Bender, Ahmed Bey.19 
�n 1667, in result of the Polish–Crimean pacification at Pidhajci/Podhajce, in 
the absence of Khan Adil Giray, the Crimean instrument was sealed by Qal�a 
Qırım Giray, two other Giray princes who were the khan’s and the qalġa’s 
nephews, and seven other Crimean dignitaries.20
The Giray princes who did not hold the post of the qalġa also felt entitled to 
participate in negotiations with foreign courts, exchange presents with foreign 
rulers, and even issue their own instruments of peace along with the instru-
ments issued by the khan. When Mehmed Giray ascended the throne in 1515, 
he was compelled to grant the post of qalġa to his younger brother, Ahmed, 
unwillingly, even though he would have preferred to grant it to his oldest 
and favorite son, Bahadır. Nonetheless, this move did not discourage Bahadır 
Giray from playing an independent role in the Crimean foreign policy. We 
know about his unsuccessful overture to negotiate a separate peace instrument 
with Moscow: in 1515 the Muscovian envoy, Ivan Mamonov, was instructed to 
negotiate with the khan only and not to accept any separate instrument from 
Bahadır (a nečto carevič stanet davati Ivanu svoju opričnjuju šertnuju gramotu, i 
Ivanu u careviča gramoty ego ne imati).21 Bahadır’s initiative to play a semi�inde-
pendent role in the Crimean foreign diplomacy was better received in Vilnius 
and Cracow. In 1517, the Giray prince issued an instrument of peace in his own 
name, corroborated with his oath and signet seal, in which he reiterated the 
contents of his father’s instrument previously sent to King Sigismund.22
The qalġa, typically identified with the heir apparent, was appointed by 
the khan from among his male family members. Nevertheless, the khan’s free-
dom of choice was limited by custom and domestic pressure, sometimes aided 
by foreign (i.e. Ottoman) intervention. Whereas the khans usually preferred to 
appoint their oldest sons, thereby tacitly promoting the rule of primogeniture, 
the Genghisid tradition favored the rule of seniority which gave the khan’s 
younger brothers precedence over the khan’s sons in the order of succession 
to the throne. This tension is e�emplified by the previously described conflict 
of Bahadır Giray, the ambitious son of Mehmed � Giray (r. 1515–1523), and 
the khan’s brother, Ahmed Giray, who held the post of qalġa from the time 
of Mehmed’s accession in 1515. In 1519, Ahmed openly rebelled against the 
khan and was killed by Bahadır, who only then ascended to the post of qalġa. 
After the violent deaths of both Mehmed and Bahadır Giray at the hands of the 
Nogays in 1523, the ne�t decade was strongly affected by the conflict between 
the late khan’s brothers, Sa‘adet Giray (r. 1523–1532) and Sahib Giray (r. 1532–
 19 Published in Kołodziejczyk,   Ottoman–Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 29�–299.
 20 Published in Kołodziejczyk,   The Crimean Khanate, pp. 9�4–990.
 21 G. Karpov and G. �tendman, eds.,      Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij Moskovskago gosudarst-
va s Krymskoju i Nogajskoju ordami i s Turciej, vol. 2: 1508–1521 gg. in Sbornik Imperatorskago 
Russkago Istoričeskago Obščestva 95 (St. Petersburg, 1�95), p. 215.
 22 Published in Kołodziejczyk,   The Crimean Khanate, pp. 633–641.
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1551), and the late khan’s sons, Ghazi Giray (r. 1523) and Islam Giray (r. 1532), 
whose short reigns were frustrated by concerted efforts of the Ottoman Porte 
and the domestic opposition in the Crimea. When a similar conflict broke out 
once again in the Crimea, and in 15�1, Khan Mehmed II Giray (r. 1577–15�4) 
was prevented from appointing his son, Sa‘adet Giray, to the post of qalġa, 
which was given instead to the khan’s rebellious brother, Alp Giray, Mehmed 
II Giray resolved to create for his son a new post of nureddin. Because nureddin 
had become third in rank in the Crimean hierarchy, it is no wonder that for-
eign courts hastened to establish direct friendly relations with this new Tatar 
dignitary. At least once, a nureddin is known to have issued his own instrument 
of peace: in 1640, Nureddin Qırım Giray sent to Poland his ‘ahdname, provided 
with his own tuġra. His document was brought to Warsaw along with the in-
struments of his two older brothers, the khan and the qalġa.23
Among the other Crimean officials who took part in diplomatic nego-
tiations, a special role was played by the chief qaraçı – the leader of the most 
prominent noble clan in the Crimea.24 This special role was already evident in 
the fifteenth century. �n 1480, during his audience in Vilnius, a Crimean envoy 
Hadji Baba swore on behalf of his lord and all the Tatar nobles a solemn oath to 
keep peace with King Casimir. Significantly, the Tatar envoy invoked by name 
only three Crimean personages: Khan Mengli Giray, the khan’s brother, Qal�a 
Yaghmurcha Sultan, and the qaraçı from the Shirin clan, Eminek. Three decades 
later, Eminek’s nephew and successor, Agısh, in his correspondence with Mos-
cow, frankly disclosed the political aspirations of the Shirins: “Are there not 
two shafts to a cart? The right shaft is my lord the khan, and the left shaft am 
I, with my brothers and children.”25 As might be expected, Agish’s name is, in 
turn, duly invoked in the peace instruments sent by Mengli Giray to Vilnius 
and Moscow in the years 1507 and 150�, respectively, although – contrary to 
his lofty ambitions – the name of the Shirin leader is preceded by the names of 
Tevkel and Mamısh, the leaders of the clans of Manghıts and Sedjevüts, who 
competed with the Shirins for the preeminence in the hierarchy of the Crimean 
noble clans and who strongly challenged the Shirins’ position in the early six-
teenth century.26
 23 Published in ibid., pp. 935–941; the instrument is preserved in the Turkish original, pro�             -
vided with Qırım Giray’s tuġra (see ibid., facs. VIIIa-c). Although the post of nureddin was 
created initially for the khan’s oldest son whereas the post of qalġa was occupied by the 
khan’s brother, it had never become a formalized rule. A khan’s son could still become 
the qalġa and, vice-versa, a khan’s brother (or any other male relative) could become the 
nureddin. 
 24 On the  qaraçıs, whose number should have been four (although this rule was not always 
observed in the Crimean Khanate), cf. n. 11 above.
 25 �uoted after Beatrice Forbes Manz, “The Clans of the Crimean Khanate 1466–1532,”            Har-
vard Ukrainian Studies 2 (197�), pp. 2�2–309, esp. p. 2�2.
 26 Cf. Kołodziejczyk,  The Crimean Khanate, pp. 33–34; the instrument sent in 1507 to King Si-
gismund is published in ibid., pp. 566–579.
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Although the Sedjevüts proved unable to establish themselves perma-
nently at the top of the Crimean noble hierarchy, the challenge of the Manghıts 
was more serious. �n the early seventeenth century, the Manghıt leader, Kan-
temir, outdid other Crimean clans by far in drawing his military strength from 
the Nogay tribes dwelling on the Black Sea steppes; he openly challenged 
the khan’s authority by establishing a semi-independent rule in Budjak and 
by invoking Ottoman mediation in his conflicts with successive khans. The 
Porte was all too happy to strengthen its hold in the region by interfering in 
the Khanate’s internal disputes.27 The Polish authorities were so desperate to 
prevent Kantemir’s raids from neighboring Budjak that the royal instrument 
from 1624, in which Sigismund ��� confirmed the conditions of Polish–Ottoman 
peace, negotiated in 1621 at Hotin, contained a special clause providing that the 
khan, the qalġa, the Manghıt leader and other Tatars – nobles (mirzas) as well 
as commoners (nec ipse chan, nec galga sultan, nec Cantimir murza, nec alii murzi 
et Tartarii) – abstain from raiding and causing harm to the royal domains.2� It is 
telling that Kantemir was listed by name in this instrument after the khan and 
the qalġa, just as Eminek had been once listed in the oath of the Tatar envoy, 
pronounced in Vilnius in 14�0.
After the Ottomans executed unruly Kantemir in 1637 and after Khan 
Bahadır Giray massacred numerous Nogay leaders in 1639, the Manghıts lost 
much of their power. The Shirins were able to reassume their position as the 
leaders of the Crimean nobility, with the Manghıts still counting as the sec-
ond most important clan in the Khanate. The Tatar instrument of 1667, result-
ing from the peace negotiations at Pidhajci/Podhajce and already mentioned 
above, was corroborated with the seals of the qalġa, two other Giray princes, 
and seven Crimean dignitaries, among whom one finds the Shirin qaraçı and 
a representative of the Manghıt clan named Murad�shah Mirza.29 It is particu-
larly interesting that the Shirin qaraçı, Mengli Giray Bey, whose name opens the 
list of non-Giray dignitaries, was “immodestly” named after the Crimean khan 
Mengli Giray who had reigned in the years 1466–1515 (with two interruptions). 
He also used the almond-like seal, which was otherwise restricted to the use of 
the Giray dynasty members, and his seal’s legend openly invoked his descent 
from Khan Hadji Giray, the founder of the Crimean Khanate.30 These were not 
 27 On Kantemir, see Mihnea Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues, 
1600–1637,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 1 (1977), pp. 273–307, esp. pp. 291–306.
 28 �or the document, issued on 1 April 1624 in Warsaw, see Kołodziejczyk,            Ottoman–Polish 
Diplomatic Relations, pp. 419–426, esp. p. 421.
 29 Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 9�6–9�7 and 9�9–990. Murad-shah Mirza is re-
ferred to as Mansur-oghlu (Mansur ułu) in the Polish te�t while in that period the Manghıts 
were alternatively known as the Mansurs or Mansur-oghlus. Murad-shah was not the clan 
leader, as the qaraçı would have been titled bey and not mirza.
 30 Cf. Ibid., p. 9�9, n. 14, and facs. �IIIc. The Shirin clan members customarily married Giray                
princesses. Therefore, the qaraçı’s claim to descent – though only matrilineal – from the 
Giray, and consequently the Genghisid family, was justified. To give just one e�ample, 
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innocent pretensions: they reflected the ambitions of the powerful clan, whose 
members had frequently influenced Crimean policy and with whose opinion 
every khan had to reckon.
The Giray family members and the leaders of the most powerful noble 
clans were not the only ones who participated in the Khanate’s foreign cor-
respondence and the procedure of peacemaking. Mengli Giray’s instrument of 
peace, sent to King Sigismund in 1507 and already described above, contains 
a long list of the Crimean dignitaries who corroborated the newly established 
peace with their oaths taken in the presence of the royal envoy. The dignitaries 
can be grouped into three categories: the dynasty members, the Muslim clergy-
men, and the leaders of the Crimean nobility.31
Dynasty members:
 - Yaghmurcha (the khan’s younger brother and qalġa)
 - Mehmed Giray (the khan’s oldest son, future qalġa and khan)
 - Ahmed Giray (the khan’s second son)
 - Yapancha (Yaghmurcha’s son)
 - Mahmud Giray (the khan’s third son)
 - Feth Giray (the khan’s fourth son)
 � Burnash (the khan’s fifth son)
Muslim clergymen:
 - Babaka Seyyid32
 - Sultan Ali33
 - Burghan Mullah34
Mahdum-shah, a daughter of Khan Mengli Giray and hence granddaughter of Khan Hadji 
Giray, was married to Devletek, the head of the Shirin clan and the son of Eminek; see �lya 
Zaytsev [Zajcev], “The Structure of the Giray Dynasty (15th–16th Centuries): Matrimonial 
and Kinship Relations of the Crimean Khans,” in E. Boikova and R. Rybakov, eds., Kinship 
in the Altaic World: Proceedings of the 48th Permanent International Altaistic Conference, Moscow 
10–15 July, 2005 (Wiesbaden, 2006), pp. 341–353, esp. p. 341. 
 31 Cf. Kołodziejczyk,  The Crimean Khanate, pp. 483–484; for more details about the listed per-
sonages, see ibid., pp. 574–576, notes 2–17, and p. 579, n. 40.
 32 Babaka or Babike Seyyid, the brother-in-law of Mengli Giray.        
 33 Probably identical with the “great mullah Ali,” mentioned by Mehmed Giray in his letter              
to Vasilij III from 1516 and referred to as “my great mullah, superior to all our mullahs, and 
also my great kadi;” see Karpov and Štendman, Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 2, p. 
299.
 34 In my book, I regarded the above two persons, Sultan Ali and Burghan Mullah, as one                
person named Sultan Ali Abdulghani (recorded as soltan ali abulgan malla or alternatively 
soltan ali aburgan malla where the letter a displayed in bold could be read as the first letter 
in a proper name but also as a conjunction in Ruthenian); see Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean 
Khanate, pp. 566 and 574. Yet, a discussion with Laimontas Karalius persuaded me that 
these were two different persons. Apart from Mengli Giray’s instrument of peace dated 
1507, Burghan Mullah is recorded two more times in the Lithuanian Register, in the docu-
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 - Baba Sheikh (on him see below)
Highest noble functionaries and leaders:
 � Mamısh Ulan, lieutenant (qaymaqam) of Qırq Yer35
 � Saqal Bey, leader of the Crimean branch of the Qıyats36
 � Tevkel Bey, leader of the Crimean Manghıts and the khan’s brother�in�law37
 � Mamısh Bey, leader of the Sedjevüts (Sedjeuts) and the khan’s brother�in�law
 � Agısh Bey, qaraçı of the Shirins
 � Devlet Bakhtı Bey, qaraçı of the Barıns and lieutenant of Qarasu Bazar3�
 - Merdan Bey, qaraçı of the Arghıns
 - Mahmud Bey, qaraçı of the Qıpchaqs.39
Apart from those listed by name, many more Tatar nobles and courtiers 
participated in the oath ceremony. A year later, in 150�, a Muscovian envoy 
Kostjantin Zabolockij resolved to remunerate each who had sworn to keep 
peace with Moscow, with one sable. It soon turned out that he had no sables 
left: twenty dissatisfied Tatars remained with empty hands.40
Well aware of the decentralized structure of Crimean politics, the Khan-
ate’s northern neighbors insisted that the oath to keep peace should be taken 
ments from 1507 and 1509; see the recently published volume: �. �larienė, L. Karalius, and 
D. Antanavičius, eds., Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 7 (1506–1539). Užrašymų knyga 7 (Vilnius, 
2011), pp. 104 and 142. Moreover, Burghan Mullah is recalled as deceased (pokojniku Bur-
gan molle) in the aforementioned letter by Mehmed Giray, addressed in 1516 to Vasilij III, 
whereas in the same letter Mullah Ali figures as a living person; cf. n. 32 above. � would like 
to thank Laimontas Karalius for his help in solving this puzzle.
 35 Mamısh Ulan, son of Sarmak Ulan, figured prominently in the diplomatic negotiations            
with Muscovy and Lithuania and headed embassies to these countries. Syroečkovskij’s 
assumption that he belonged to the Qıpchaq clan has been challenged by Beatrice �orbes 
Manz; see Manz, �The Clans of the Crimean Khanate,” pp. 292–293. �n the period con-
cerned, the post of the Qıpchaq qaraçı was occupied by Mahmud Bey (see below), whose 
political influence was nevertheless much weaker than that of Mamısh Ulan.
 36 Saqal’s father (or perhaps a more distant ancestor), Qıyat Mansur, was the founder of the               
branch of the Qıyat clan, which had left the Volga region after 1380 and settled in Lithuania 
and the Crimea.
 37 Tevkel, son of Temir, was the Manghıt (i.e., Nogay) leader who had entered the Crimean               
service in 1503, after the collapse of the Great Horde; his sister, Nur Sultan, was Mengli 
Giray’s wife.
 38 Devlet Bakhtı also figured prominently in Crimean international policy and led embassies            
to King Sigismund I (1512–1513) and to the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1515).
 39 The last two beys are not listed by name in the instrument proper but their names can be                  
found in the appended list that has been recorded in the Lithuanian Register along with the 
şartname; the list also contains the names of Mehmed Giray, Mamısh Ulan, Agısh Bey, and 
Devlet Bakhtı Bey, who are already mentioned in the instrument proper; in 1508, Merdan 
and Mahmud Beys also swore an oath to preserve the peace with Muscovy.
 40 Anna �oro�kevič,  Rus’ i Krym. Ot sojuza k protivostojaniju. Konec XV – načalo XVI ss. (Mos-
cow, 2001), p. 252.
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not merely by the khan, but by his family members, dignitaries, and promi-
nent Crimean clans as well. A very long list of those who had taken an oath to 
keep peace with Muscovy in 1524 has been preserved in a copy in the Russian 
archives. It includes over two hundred names, grouped into the following cat-
egories: Muslim clergymen (seyyids and mullahs), the Giray princes, the beys 
and mirzas from the Shirin and Barın clans, the members of the khan’s council 
(divan), the khan’s mother and other prominent harem ladies, the Manghıts, 
the sheikhs and kadis, the palace clerks and the khan’s courtiers, Qal�a Özbek 
Giray’s retinue members, Prince Islam Giray’s retinue members, the ulans, the 
Sedjevüts, Arghıns, Kipchaks, Qongrats, Qıyats, and others.41
It is worth noting that in both 1507 and 1524, Muslim clergymen were 
listed before the clan leaders. This was also the case in 150�, as shown by a list 
of the Crimean dignitaries who swore to keep peace with Muscovy.42 The only 
clergyman invoked by name in 150� was Baba Sheikh, the mullah at the khan’s 
court, referred to in the Russian sources as molna and bogomolec. One of his 
sons, Hadji Mehmed Sheikh-zade, was then the mullah at the court of Prince 
Mehmed Giray. Another, Qurtqa, figures among the clergymen on the list from 
1524. In the list from 1507, Baba Sheikh was preceded formally by three other 
Muslim hierarchs, but his political position was probably greater because three 
years later Sigismund asked him to mediate the peace, invoking his great influ-
ence on the khan. In Polish domestic correspondence, Baba Sheikh was then 
designated as the khan’s archbishop (archiepiscopus imperatoris in Latin).43 We 
might assume that his prestige, already high in Crimean society, was further 
elevated because of his correspondence with Sigismund, in which the mul-
lah was compared explicitly with the archbishop of Gniezno, who in Poland 
crowned the king and acted as interrex during the interregna. Unfortunately, 
the role of the Muslim clergy in Crimean society and politics is still very much 
under-researched.44
The attitude of the khans in relation to the idea that not just the ruler, 
but the whole Tatar society should participate in the process of peacemaking 
was ambiguous. On the one hand, admitting the limits of his power dimin-
 41 Moscow, Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arxiv drevnix aktov [RGADA], f. 123, op. 1, no. 6, fol.              
86b–88b; published in ��storičeskoe i diplomatičeskoe sobranie del prois�odiv�i� meždu 
rossijskimi velikimi knjaz’jami i byvšimi v Kryme tatarskimi carjami s 1462 po 1533 god.” 
Collected by A. Malinovskij, in Zapiski Odesskago Obščestva istorii i drevnostej, vol. 5 (Odessa, 
1863), pp. 178–419, esp. pp. 412–415; in Central Asia, the Qıyats originally formed a subsec-
tion of the �ongrats.
 42 See Karpov and �tendman,    Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 2, p. 20.
 43 Cf. Kołodziejczyk,  The Crimean Khanate, pp. 37, 4�5, and 575, n. 11.
 44 Pace the studies by Damir Isxakov, which are nonetheless based almost solely on Russian              
sources and focused on the early si�teenth century; cf. Damir �s�akov, ��slam v pozdnezo-
lotoordynskix tatarskix xanstvax,” in R. Muxametšin, ed., Islam v Srednem Povolž’e: istorija 
i sovremennost’. Očerki (Kazan, 2001), pp. 59–89, esp. pp. 74–82; Damir �s�akov, �Seidy v 
Krymskom xanstve,” Qasevet 33 (200�), pp. 14–19.
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ished the prestige of the khan as a sovereign monarch. On various occasions, 
the khans emphasized their exclusive right to negotiate with foreign courts in 
their correspondence and in disputes with foreign envoys as to who should 
participate in the ceremony of oath-taking that usually cemented the exchange 
of peace instruments (see below). On the other hand, claiming the limits of his 
power served as a convenient excuse for a khan who was unable or unwill-
ing to restrain his subjects from raiding the domains of a neighboring ruler, 
even though the two states formally remained at peace. In 1566, when Tatar 
troops had been invited by the Ottoman sultan, Suleyman the Magnificent, to 
participate in his campaign in Hungary and the campaign was prolonged by 
the siege of the fortress of Szigetvár, Khan Devlet Giray (r. 1551–1577) openly 
forewarned the envoy of Ivan IV that although he wished a peace with the tsar, 
he could not swear an oath in the name of “the whole land”45 because many 
beys and mirzas, along with Qal�a Mehmed Giray, were still overseas.46
Who iS in charge? the Khanate in the eyeS of itS northern neighborS
The decentralized structure of Crimean politics provoked different atti-
tudes among members of the foreign courts. On the one hand, both the Musco-
vian and the Polish–Lithuanian diplomacies strove to appease with kind words 
and gifts as many Crimean notables as possible. On the other hand, Crimean 
partners at times displayed growing irritation with the need to negotiate each 
agreement repeatedly with numerous Crimean dignitaries who all claimed 
that they were entitled to do so and e�pected fitting gifts in return. Curiously, 
their Portuguese contemporaries experienced quite similar cross-cultural en-
counters in West Africa.47
 45 In the Russian version:    šertovat’ vsej zemlej; as described earlier, the e�pression vsja zemlja, 
encountered in Muscovian sources, typically referred to the Tatar noble assembly known 
as the qurultay. 
 46 Aleksandr Vinogradov,  Russko-krymskie otnošenija: 50-e – vtoraja polovina 70-x godov XVI 
veka, vol. 1 (Moscow, 2007), p. 66.
 47 Michał Tymowski, a Polish medievalist historian and anthropologist, offers an illuminating           
case study by tracing the whereabouts surrounding the death of a Danish knight, Valarte, 
who commanded one of the Portuguese trading expeditions to the shores of today’s Sen-
egal. In 1447, Valarte successfully negotiated a trade agreement with a local leader named 
Guitenya, who assured his European partners that he was furnished with supreme author-
ity by the head ruler of the Serer tribe, who was absent in pursuit of a military campaign. 
Yet, when Guitenya left to hunt elephants, several Europeans, including Valarte, were 
killed in an ambush. In his article, Tymowski strove to reconstruct the internal structure 
of the fifteenth�century Serer society. According to the Polish scholar, by his negotiations 
with European merchants Guitenya sought to elevate his political position and simulta-
neously gain wealth. Yet, his real power was severely limited by other local leaders and 
community members who also took part in the negotiations and deliberately frustrated 
Guitenya’s plans during his temporary absence; see Michał Tymowski, �Dlaczego zginął 
Valarte? Śmierć duńskiego rycerza w czasie wyprawy do Afryki Zachodniej w połowie 
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�n 1515, when the Muscovian chancery declined the offer of Bahadır Giray 
to issue a separate instrument of peace along with the instrument of his father, 
Khan Mehmed I Giray (see above), the move was apparently dictated by the 
unwillingness to send additional gifts to the ambitious Giray prince, who acted 
as if he were a sovereign ruler.4� Negotiating each additional peace agreement 
involved more money spent on gifts, sending and hosting envoys, etc.
The wish to limit the number of embassies and envoys is expressed open-
ly in Article 10 of the Polish–Lithuanian instrument, negotiated with a Crimean 
envoy in Cracow and sent to Khan Sahib Giray for ultimate acceptance in 1541: 
“The khan should not send numerous couriers to His Royal Majesty because 
it causes great detriment [...] in His Majesty’s treasury.”49 The royal side also 
sought to prevent the khan’s subjects from sending separate embassies to the 
royal court.
In the khan’s instrument from 1542, the offer was plainly rejected. Sa-
hib Giray emphasized the right of all the Giray princes (titled as sultans in the 
Crimea) as well as the Crimean qaraçıs to send separate embassies to foreign 
courts, invoking the ancient tradition, the qaraçıs’ military power and their 
social standing parallel to that of the Lithuanian and Polish lords. His only 
concession was his advice to the king not to receive the envoys sent by other 
Crimean subjects:
Envoys and couriers should be sent [to you] by us and our sons: Emin Giray 
Sultan and other sultans. As they used to be sent formerly, also now they 
should be sent likewise by the aforementioned sultans. And as regards the 
qaraçıs, they have each 20,000 or 30,000 servants and they used to send envoys 
and couriers; should we now reduce their number [i.e., the number of their 
envoys]? They used to send envoys in the times of our ancestors and fathers, 
we cannot reduce their number. As you have the Lithuanian and Polish lords 
at your side, so they are their peers at our side. But other people should not 
send envoys. And even if [envoys] are sent by other people, you should not 
receive them and we will gladly accept it. If you receive those who come with-
out any reason, they will not stop coming. So if they come without any reason, 
�V wieku,” in S. Kuczyński, A. Rachuba, and M. Tymowski, eds., Afryka, Orient, Pol-
ska. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Dziubińskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin 
(Warsaw, 2007), pp. 133–143.
 4� The expression vol’nyj čelovek (�free man”), referring to the khan, figured prominently in 
the Crimean correspondence with Muscovy, preserved today in Russian copies; the term 
reflected the ancient Mongol–Tatar notion of sovereignty and probably derived from the 
Mongol–Turkic term darhan/tarhan. It expressed the sovereign’s independence from other 
rulers and especially his right to endow his subjects, including those foreign rulers whom 
he regarded as vassals, with titles, lands, or privileges at his will; see �oro�kevič, Rus’ i 
Krym, pp. 117–118; Vadim Trepavlov, “Belyj car’”: Obraz monarxa i predstavlenija o poddan-
stve u narodov Rossii XV–XVIII vv. (Moscow, 2007), pp. 3�–40.
 49 A ne maet’ car mnohyx honcov svoyx do Korolja Eho Mylosty slaty, bo Hospodar[u] Eho Mylost[y] 
škoda velykaja u skarbe Eho Mylosty sja deet’; published in Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khan-
ate, pp. 724 and 727.
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you should send them back with empty hands so that they should not come 
again; thus you should know.50
Significantly, the khan did not forbid his remaining subjects to send em-
bassies abroad, but only relieved the king from the obligation of feeding and 
hosting them. At the same time, this obligation remained in power with regard 
to the embassies sent by the khan, the Giray princes, and the Crimean qaraçıs.
Although not mentioned in the correspondence presented above, female 
members of the Giray dynasty also participated in diplomatic exchanges.51 
In 1539, Sahib Giray emphasized the right of “us, our wives, daughters, and 
daughters-in-law, [...] the qalġa sultan and all [other] sultans, whatever their 
number, and [...] the four qaraçıs, and [...] the two mirzas from the retinue of 
each qaraçı” to send embassies to Poland–Lithuania.52
The royal efforts to limit the number and size of Crimean embassies con-
tinued during the reign of Sahib Giray’s successor, Devlet Giray, but their ef-
fects were rather unimpressive. In a letter sent to King Sigismund Augustus in 
1552, the new khan adopted an almost conciliatory tone and remarked that his 
family consisted of merely four wives, two sons, and two daughters, in com-
parison to the two wives, six sons, and six daughters of Sahib Giray, hence the 
royal treasury would save on extra presents.53 In his instrument of peace, sent 
along with the aforementioned letter, the Crimean ruler engaged:
And we should not send more envoys and couriers but only the number that 
used to be heretofore. According to the custom, envoys and couriers should 
be sent primarily by us and our wives, the qalġa sultan and other sultans, three 
qaraçıs and two mirzas, their sons, and by nobody else. If more envoys and 
couriers were to go, you may send them back without giving them anything, 
and I will not reproach you, our brother, for this, because as you lavish gifts 
on the envoys and couriers who come to you, on seeing this, they do not want 
 50 Published in ibid., p. 73�.    
 51 On the correspondence of the ladies from the Giray family with the Swedish court, see               
Elżbieta Święcicka, �The Diplomatic Letters by Crimean Keräy Ladies to the Swedish Roy-
al House,” Rocznik Orientalistyczny 55:1 (2002), pp. 57–90. In the Habsburg Imperial Court, 
where the protocol barred females from receiving foreign embassies, the letters of Crimean 
ladies (e.g. the mother of the khan) were typically delivered to and responded by the em-
peror himself; see Vienna, Haus�, Hof� und Staatsarchiv, Türkei �, 130, Conv. B (April–�une 
1658), fol. 67a�b; Türkei �, 134, f. 66 (�une–August 1662), fol. 88a�b; Türkei �, 144, f. 69 (�anu-
ary–March 1673), fol. 63a–64a, 69a; Türkei �, 150, 2 (�anuary–�une 1680), fol. 75a–78b; cf. 
Mária �vanics [�vanič], �Posol’stva krymski� tatar pri Venskom dvore v 1598–1682 gg. (iz 
istorii krymsko-tatarskoj diplomatii �VI–�VII vv.),” in I. Zajcev and S. Oreškova, eds., 
Turcica et Ottomanica. Sbornik statej v čest’ 70-letija M. S. Mejera (Moscow, 2006), pp. 226–237, 
esp. p. 234.
 52 See Kołodziejczyk,  The Crimean Khanate, pp. 719–720.
 53 The letter, dated May 15, 1552, is published in M. Obolen’skij and �. Danilovič, eds.,               Kniga 
posol’skaja Metriki Velikago Knjažestva Litovskago, soderžaščaja v sebe diplomatičeskija snošenija 
Litvy v gosudarstvovanie korolja Sigizmunda-Avgusta (s 1545 po 1572 god) (Moscow, 1�43), pp. 
60–63.
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to stop going, but if you send them back with empty hands, you would see 
yourself whether they would come again.54
In analogy to Polish–Lithuanian rulers, Muscovian rulers also sought to 
limit the number and size of Tatar embassies that visited Moscow annually, 
consuming large amounts of food and fodder at the expense of their hosts, and 
extorting gifts on behalf of those who had sent them. The correspondence of 
�van ��� with Mengli Giray, originating from the end of the fifteenth century, 
is full of the grand duke’s requests that the khan not send embassies of redun-
dant size (ne vo mnogix ljudej; lišnix ljudej ne posylat’). Two Crimean envoys, 
who visited Moscow in 1521, were accompanied by almost 100 “men of rank” 
(dobryx ljudej) while the entire embassy might have numbered 400 horsemen. 
Not incidentally, this exceptionally large embassy was sent after the devastat-
ing raid of 1521, when the humiliated Muscovian court sought peace at almost 
any price, fearing a restoration of the Golden Horde by the ambitious khan 
Mehmed I Giray.55 Although the embassy was exceptionally large in the his-
tory of Muscovian–Crimean relations, it still did not match the size once at-
tained by the embassies from the Golden Horde, which might have greatly 
exceeded 500 horsemen.56 Although this size certainly reflected the hegemonic 
pretensions of Tatar rulers, expressed by ceremonial pomp, it also expressed 
the composite and decentralized structure of Tatar society, whose numerous 
members wanted to benefit from the awe in which the Tatar cavalry was per-
ceived by the Slavs.
It was not until the seventeenth century that the Russian and Polish courts 
managed to include respective clauses in their treaties negotiated with the 
khans, limiting the number and size of the Crimean embassies sent to Moscow 
and Warsaw.57 A changed military balance between the Crimean Khanate and 
its northern neighbors enabled the latter to ignore or openly reject Tatar claims 
for augmented gifts or even to “punish” the Tatars for their raids executed 
during a formal peace by not sending gifts at all. Simultaneously, the khans 
adopted a centralizing policy and preferred to send smaller embassies com-
 54 Y my tež ne maem bolšej poslov y hon’cov, odno tak, jako y pered tym byvalo, podluh obyčaju posly 
y hon’cy majut’ yty najpervej ot nas y ot žon našyx, y ot koalkgy carevyča, y ot ynšyx carevyčov, y 
ot trex koračeev, a ot yx synov dvux murz, a bol’šej toho ne maet’ nyxto slaty. Estli by bolšyi toho 
posly abo y honcy mely xodyt’, vy tež nyčoho ym ne dajte, otpustyte; ja za to vam, bratu svoemu, 
nyčoho ne maem movyty, bo posly y hon’cy, kotoryi xodjat’ do vas, vy tyx daruete, ony tež vydečy 
to, toho xožen’ja svoeho perestat’ ne xočut’; jako li by este takovyx ny ščym otpustyly, samy by este 
toho dosmotrely, estli by ony u druhyj raz xodyly; published in Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean 
Khanate, pp. 745 and 751.
 55 Apart from securing his rule in Kazan and Astrakhan, Mehmed Giray contemplated a res-             
toration of the independent Duchy of Rjazan’ whose territories had been recently annexed 
by Muscovy; see Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, p. 60.
 56 �oro�kevič, Rus’ i Krym, p. 270.
 57 Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 467–470.
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posed of trusted men instead of sharing the splendor and gifts with numerous 
members of Tatar nobility.
“oath-taKing criSeS” anD the centralizing effortS of the crimean KhanS
During the same period, the khans tried to bar the members of Tatar no-
bility and even the members of the khan’s court from participating in the tra-
ditional procedure of oath-taking that usually took place during audiences of 
foreign envoys. In 1623, Mehmed III Giray (r. 1623–162�) announced to a Rus-
sian envoy that – unlike in the times of his predecessor, Djanibek Giray – his 
courtiers were merely his slaves (Rus. xolopy) and not his companions, so there 
was no need for them to take an oath.5� A similar scene was observed in 1654, 
when a Polish envoy sent to Baghchasaray insisted that the newly negotiated 
treaty be confirmed not merely by the khan, but also by Tatar dignitaries. �n 
response, the envoy heard that it was unnecessary because, unlike the Polish 
king, the khan was an absolute ruler. If we are to believe the envoy’s report, 
Khan Mehmed IV Giray himself retorted: “like God is one on the earth, so am I 
the single lord” (jako Bóg jeden jest na ziemi, tak i ja pan jeden).59 When the envoy 
still insisted that at least the Shirin qaraçı should take an oath, he was told that 
the latter was absent from the Crimea but he might meet him on his way home 
in the steppe and there try to bring him to the oath.
After another 30 years had lapsed, in 16�1, a Russian request that the oath 
should be taken not just by the khan but also by the �five noble Crimean clans” 
was similarly rejected one more time. The Russian envoys heard that just like 
bringing their tsar’s subjects to the oath would diminish his “monarchic hon-
or” (gosudarskaja čest’), it would be equally unfitting to demand that the khan’s 
engagement be confirmed by his subjects.60
 5� Aleksej Novosel’skij,  Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoj polovine XVII veka 
(Moscow – Leningrad, 194�), p. 111. On Mehmed III Giray’s centralizing domestic policy 
that was inspired by the Ottoman model even though in his foreign policy the khan was 
often conflicted with the Porte, cf. Oleksa Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 2: 
Krymskie xany pervoj poloviny XVII stoletija v bor’be za samostojatel’nost’ i edinovlastie (Kiev 
– Baghchasaray, 2009), pp. �6–��.
 59 �or the diary of Mariusz �ask�lski, see Warsaw, Archiwum Gł�wne Akt Dawnych [hereaf�            -
ter AGAD], Libri Legationum, no. 33, fol. 41b–45a, esp. fol. 44b; on his two embassies to the 
Crimea effected in 1654, see Sławomir Augusiewicz, �Dwa poselstwa Mariusza Stanisława 
�ask�lskiego na Krym w 1654 roku,” in �. Wolański and R. Kołodziej, eds., Staropolski ogląd 
świata. Rzeczpospolita między okcydentalizacją a orientalizacją, vol. 1: Przestrzeń kontaktów 
(Toruń, 2009), pp. 46–60; and Kołodziejczyk, The Crimean Khanate, pp. 164–16�.
 60 N. Murzakevič, ed., �Spisok s statejnago spiska Velikago Gosudarja Ego Carskago Veličestva            
poslannikov: stol’nika i polkovnika i namestnika perejaslavskogo Vasil’ja Mixajlova syna 
Tjapkina, d’jaka Nikity Zotova,” in: Zapiski Odesskago obščestva istorii i drevnostej, vol. 2, 
otdelenie vtoroe i tretie (1�50), pp. 56�–65�, esp. pp. 630–632. On the three “oath-taking 
crises” in the Crimea which took place in the years 1623, 1654, and 1681, cf. Kołodziejczyk, 
The Crimean Khanate, pp. 4�6–4�7.
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It would be tempting to see the last procedural dispute, recorded during 
the reign of Murad Giray (r. 167�–16�3), as an illustration of this khan’s alleged 
efforts to return to the Mongol roots as the means of strengthening his rule. 
Such a plan of abandoning the Muslim sharia and replacing it with the Geng-
hisid law (töre-i cingiziyye) was imputed to Murad Giray by an eighteenth-cen-
tury Crimean chronicler, Seyyid Mehmed Riza. Yet, in a recent doctoral thesis, 
Natalia Królikowska demonstrates persuasively that this legend should be dis-
missed as spurious. Murad Giray certainly wanted to consolidate his rule, but 
if this was his wish, adopting the Ottoman model was much more handy than 
restoring the Mongol tradition, which in fact expected the khan to honor the 
right of aristocratic clans to share the government with the ruler and to respect 
their wide immunities in controlling their hereditary lands.61
Not by accident, the most notorious “centralizers” among the Crimean 
khans, to mention such e�emplary figures as Sahib Giray, Ghazi �� Giray, or 
Mehmed ��� Giray, were also the first to abandon Mongol traditions and adopt 
Ottoman institutions such as the formation of the janissary-like segbans, a court 
peopled by servants, designated as aghas and reminiscent of Ottoman viziers, 
or a chancery that introduced the Turkish–Ottoman language and the Ottoman 
pompous forms. To be sure, the same rulers, although inspired by Ottoman in-
stitutions, were at the same time ready to challenge Ottoman hegemony in the 
region and to invoke the Genghisid tradition as a legitimizing tool uniting the 
Crimean subjects around the khan. The ceremonial dispute between Russian 
and Tatar diplomats, recorded in 16�1 and invoked above, suggests that, in 
building their prestige as autocratic rulers, the khans might have employed not 
just the Ottoman model, but also the Russian one. The attractiveness of the Rus-
sian model for an ambitious Crimean khan can be illustrated best by the tragic 
fate of Shahin Giray (r. 1777–17�3), the last Crimean khan who in the following 
century, infatuated with Catherine the Great and her court, strove to emulate 
her absolutist reforms to reconstruct his own state, later to be rejected first by 
his own subjects and then deposed by his Russian patrons.
Wittfogel à rebourS?
Political osmosis and cultural borrowing rarely work in only one direc-
tion.62 If the khans are known to have adopted Ottoman or Russian models, 
 61 Natalia Królikowska, “Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate: A Study on              
the Reign of Murad Giray (167�–16�3)” (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Institute 
of History, PAS, Warsaw, 2010), pp. 64–65, 71–74.
 62 For some preliminary remarks related to mutual inspirations and political osmosis be-           
tween, on the one hand, the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires, and on the other hand, the 
two decentralized monarchies whose rulers were kept in check by powerful nobilities: the 
Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, 
�Turcja i Krym,” in M. Kopczyński and W. Tygielski, eds., Rzeczpospolita-Europa: XVI–XVIII 
wiek. Próba konfrontacji (Studies in Honor of Antoni Mączak) (Warsaw, 1999), pp. 67–76.
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we should e�pect that the Crimean model might have also influenced the 
Khanate’s neighbors. In a recent monograph of Muscovian–Crimean relations 
in the mid-sixteenth century, Aleksandr Vinogradov notes with some surprise 
the lasting importance of the noble council (bojarskaja duma) in the Muscovian 
diplomatic contacts with the Crimea, even during the centralizing reforms of 
Ivan the Terrible, who was notorious for his mistrust of the boyars. The Rus-
sian scholar suggests that because the khan’s noble councilors, designated as 
“men of rank” (dobrye ljudi) in the Russian records, actively participated in the 
Crimean foreign correspondence and in the audiences of Muscovian envoys 
in Baghchasaray, the tsar accepted a parallel participation of boyars in foreign 
exchanges with the Crimea for ceremonial reasons, even if the actual political 
position of Russian nobles vis-à-vis the tsar was more limited than the position 
of their Crimean counterparts vis-à-vis the khan.63
What we observe here is certainly not the radiation of Wittfogelian “Ori-
ental despotism” from the Tatars to Russia. Rather we observe the opposite: 
ruled collectively by the khan and the nobles, the decentralized political sys-
tem of the Crimean Khanate checked autocratic tendencies in Moscow and per-
suaded the Russian tsar to tolerate the nobility’s greater participation in the 
conduct of state affairs than he would have wished for.
contemporary anD later receptionS of the crimean SyStem of poWer 
(a poliSh caSe)
A country in which the Crimean Khanate was nonetheless often presented 
as a despotic and absolutist monarchy is Poland. Mariusz Jaskólski, the Polish 
envoy to the Crimea, whose report from 1654 has already been invoked above, 
put in the mouth of the Crimean vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha, a statement that 
“we have [in the Crimea] the absolutum dominium: whatever the khan orders, 
so it must be.”64 Yet, are we really to believe that a Crimean vizier, no matter 
how well educated, used the Latin term absolutum dominium in his conversa-
tion with a Polish envoy? Or rather the envoy entered this term in his report, 
scheduled to be read in the Diet on his return to Poland, to gain popularity 
among the Polish noblility? The term absolutum dominium was part of the Pol-
ish domestic discourse of the period and was widely used by noble republicans 
in their struggle with – real as well as imagined – absolutist tendencies of the 
kings from the Vasa dynasty.65
 63 Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnošenija, vol. 1, p. �1.
 64 [...] bo to u nas absolutum dominium: co chan każe, to być musi; see Warsaw, AGAD, Libri 
Legationum, no. 33, fol. 42a.
 65 Cf. my paper “Should We Throw Away Western Sources? Western ‘Didactic Prose’ on the              
Oriental Societies from Herodotus to Kapuściński,” presented at the Nineteenth Sympo-
sium of the Comité International d’études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes [CIEPO-19] in Van 
(26–30 July 2010).
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More than two centuries after Jaskólski, Henryk Sienkiewicz, a Polish 
nineteenth-century writer, composed his most popular historical novel, The 
Deluge, which is set in the seventeenth century. In an invented dialogue be-
tween two semi�fictitious characters, the novel’s protagonist Andrzej Kmicic, a 
valiant Polish nobleman and soldier, and Akbah Ulan, a commander of Tatar 
troops sent by the Crimean khan to help the Poles fight against the Swedish 
invasion of 1655–1660, Akbah Ulan initially refuses to obey Kmicic, stating that 
his obedience is directly to the khan and not the Polish king or his officers. �n 
response, Kmicic gives him a sound beating and argues: “the khan gave you 
to the king like a dog or a falcon, so do not insult him unless you want to be 
taken on a leash like a dog!” The argument, along with the beating, persuades 
the Tatar commander to subdue himself and to remain fully devoted to his new 
master. As the next scene illustrates, when somewhat later, Kmicic orders some 
of his Tatar subordinates to hang each other as a punishment for their maraud-
ing, Akbah Ulan fully consents and hastens the culprits to do it promptly so 
that they do not upset the Bagadyr (Tat. “hero”), as Kmicic was soon named 
by his Asiatic subordinates.66 Sienkiewicz was probably unaware that the title 
Ulan, with which he labeled his fictitious Tatar character, revealed his Geng-
hisid descent, but by doing so he inadvertently strengthened the message of 
this scene even further: here we have a noble descendant of Genghis khan and 
simultaneously a purely Oriental character who, accustomed to slavery in his 
homeland and persuaded by the physical and moral strength of his Polish, i.e., 
European, opponent, acknowledges his superiority and turns his humiliation 
into devotion and love. A purely Orientalist discourse indeed.
Even today, at least one Polish historian believes that the Crimean Khan-
ate was an “absolutist monarchy,” although he hastens to add that the khan’s 
absolutism was tempered by the domestic power of noble clans and the exter-
nal influence of Ottoman sultans.67
Only a few years before Jaskólski’s visit to the Crimea, in 164�, the Ta-
tars supported a Cossack revolt against Poland–Lithuania and invaded Pol-
ish Ukraine, taking prisoner the head commanders of the Polish army: Crown 
Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki and Crown �ield Hetman Marcin Kalinowski. 
Because the Tatar action was not authorized by the Ottoman Porte, the sultan 
demanded that the prisoners be dispatched to Istanbul to be released and sent 
back to Poland. Yet, Khan Islam III Giray (r. 1644–1654) openly refused by in-
forming the Ottoman kapıcı başı, sent from Istanbul to collect the Polish prison-
ers, that both hetmans were private prisoners of the Tatar nobles (mirzas) who 
participated in the campaign. The khan explained that when he had asked the 
mirzas to deliver their prisoners, they had refused because they expected a fair 
 66 Henryk Sienkiewicz,  Potop (Warsaw, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 504 and 510.
 67 Marek Wagner, �Tatarskie elity władzy w latach 1684–1699,” in Marek Wagner,           W cieniu 
szukamy jasności chwały: Studia z dziejów panowania Jana III Sobieskiego (1684–1696) (Siedlce, 
2002), pp. 97–109, esp. p. 97.
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price for the hetmans’ redemption.6� Unmistakably, this portrayal presents a 
diplomatic ruse of the khan who, unwilling to cede to the Porte, blamed his 
subjects for their unwillingness to cooperate. Yet, could we imagine a Russian 
tsar or an Ottoman sultan refusing a foreign request by openly admitting that 
his subjects would not let him fulfill it? Already in the preceding century, in 
1520, Khan Mehmed I Giray declined an invitation from Sultan Suleyman to at-
tack Poland, in coordination with the Ottoman campaign against Hungary, by 
explaining that he feared a reaction of the Shirin clan because one of the Shirin 
mirzas was detained as a hostage in Poland and risked death if the Tatars broke 
the peace.69
concluSion: tatar tyranny vS. tatar anarchy
The image of the political structure of the Crimean Khanate, presented 
above, suggests a decentralized monarchy whose ruler had to share his sov-
ereignty with his family members as well as the Tatar and Nogay nobles. Cer-
tainly the Crimean Khanate was not identical to the fourteenth-century Golden 
Horde or the thirteenth-century Genghisid empire, but it was a direct descen-
dant of both, consciously invoking the common roots. The departure from the 
Mongol tradition and the Genghisid law occurred gradually and slowly, but 
paradoxically, it was the adoption of foreign – especially Ottoman – models 
which served to strengthen the khan’s rule. Consequently, the Mongol past 
can hardly be blamed for the autocratic tendencies in the Khanate’s domestic 
policy.
�t is an apparent parado� that two conflicting stereotypes e�ist simulta-
neously in the descriptions of the Crimean Khanate: one of a despotic mon-
archy and the other of a noble anarchy. In the Russian, Polish, and other East 
European historiographies, the Tatar nobles were often presented as savage 
and greedy “barbarians” extorting innumerous gifts and bribes from their more 
dignified and civilized Slavic neighbors. Should we blame the Tatars for trying 
to benefit from peace negotiations conducted by their rulers with their foreign 
peers? One can easily identify a certain inconsistence if one studies modern 
 68 See the letter by the Moldavian hospodar, Vasile Lupu, sent to a Polish magnate, Mikołaj               
Ostror�g, on August 16, 1648, quoted in Dariusz Milewski, �Wyjście hetman�w koronnych 
z niewoli tatarskiej w 1650 r.,” in Dariusz Milewski, ed., Rzeczpospolita wobec Orientu w ep-
oce nowożytnej (Zabrze 2011), pp. 54–67, esp. p. 56.
 69 Cf. Kołodziejczyk,  The Crimean Khanate, p. 59; the letter of Mehmed Giray to Sultan Suley-
man, in which the khan invoked several reasons for his refusal to participate in the Otto-
man campaign, is preserved in the Topkapı Palace archives; it has been published twice in 
Chantal Lemercier-�uelquejay, “Les khanats de Kazan et de Crimée face à la Moscovie en 
1521, d’après un document inédit des Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı,” Cahiers du 
monde russe et soviétique 12 (1971), pp. 4�1–490, and A. Bennigsen, P. N. Boratav, D. Desaive 
et Ch. Lemercier-�uelquejay, Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de 
Topkapı (Paris – The Hague, 197�), pp. 110–117.
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scholarly approaches used to characterize different societies. When describing 
the decentralized, pre-modern Tatar society, a Polish scholar would typically 
use such labels as �tribal” or �primitive.” Yet, when describing his/her own 
society in the same period, the same Polish scholar would proudly invoke the 
emancipation of the nobility from the dynastic rule, the birth of the modern 
notion of the Polish Crown (Corona Regni Poloniae), whose lands could not be 
alienated by the monarch without the consent of the nobility, and the rise of the 
state chancery independent from the royal court. Why should we treat the de-
centralization of Tatar society as proof of its backwardness, and simultaneously 
praise the decentralization of Polish society as a sign of progress?70
When blaming some71 early modern societies for their decentralization 
and “anarchic chaos,” we should be aware of the ambiguous role played by 
its often idealized antitype, namely centralization. For a human being, living 
in the twenty�first century, there is something deeply disturbing in traditional 
praises of such centralized state structures as France of Louis �IV or Prussia of 
Frederic the Great. Few people today would be happy to serve in the Prussian 
army, pay Prussian taxes, or – to put it à la foucaultienne – experience Prussian 
discipline. Admittedly, in the twentieth century many oil companies preferred 
to set up their businesses in developing countries ruled by dictators rather than 
by parliaments because it was easier to negotiate with the former than with the 
latter, but they were rarely praised for this efficiency in the Western media.72
While not defending the extremes of anarchy, which early modern Tatars 
(as well as early modern Poles) have often been accused of, I would still like to 
pose the question: was it so wrong and “non-modern” that the Tatars negoti-
ated their peace treaties collectively and had their international engagements 
 70 Similar questions with respect to Ottoman society are posed in a recent, highly inspir-             
ing and provoking book by Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social 
Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge, 2010). For instance, the author asks 
“How have we been led to believe that the English Civil War, which led to the execution of 
Charles I in 1649, and the ‘Glorious’ Revolution of 16��, which dethroned Charles I’s son 
James II, were advances in the history of limited government, whereas the regicide of the 
Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim in 164� and the deposition of Ibrahim’s son Mehmed IV in 16�7, 
for instance, were simply signs of decline?” (p. 5).
 71 With a notable exception of the English early modern society, which typically has been              
praised for its “individualism.”
 72 Anybody who works in the academia today is aware of the omnipresent conflict between              
centralization and decentralization in present university life. What I found especially tell-
ing was my experience as a visiting professor at one American university. While I was 
surprised that their president was appointed, and not elected as was the rector of my home 
institution, my American host was equally shocked by the collegial autonomy of univer-
sity faculties which he learned about during his scholarly trip to Europe. “Is it a relict of 
feudalism – he asked me one day – that your faculty councils in Europe are so powerful 
vis-à-vis the dean?” “Well, we call it democracy” was my answer.
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sworn and confirmed not merely by their monarchs, but by numerous other 
members of their society as well?
